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With changes in the makeup of the Supreme Court and new cases challenging 
the scope of federal authority getting litigated every year, the prospect of the 
Court revisiting its Commerce Clause jurisprudence is becoming a realistic 
possibility. But overturning decades of precedent outright could be disruptive. 
Is there a way for the Court to respect both precedent and the original under-
standing of the Commerce Clause? This Article proposes charting such a 
course. By preserving the key post-New Deal understanding that the Com-
merce Clause allows for the regulation of production, Congress can continue 
to have regulatory authority over important economic areas—on which the 
operation of the administrative state relies. But by incorporating a test similar 
to that of personal jurisdiction’s stream-of-commerce test, courts can shield 
local activity from federal regulation—giving renewed meaning to a found-
ational liberty-protecting provision.  
 
This Article begins by examining the historical development of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, providing a context for understanding the tensions 
within this area of law. It then utilizes an approach developed by Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport for determining on a neutral basis whether a prece-
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dent has become so entrenched as to preclude its overruling. This Article then 
applies that approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Informed by those 
results, it offers a familiar way for courts to give more meaning to the Comm-
erce Clause’s protections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no denying that the scope of Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause1 has greatly expanded since the mid-1930s.2 The Commerce 
Clause gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. Tradition-
ally, the federal government could regulate only the exchange of goods 
between states and flow of goods from one state’s market to another. But in the 
1940s, the Supreme Court refined its understanding of the Commerce Clause 
and allowed for any activity that affects interstate commerce—no matter how 
remote—to fall within Congress’s regulatory authority. This expansive 
understanding forms the legal basis for much of our modern administrative 
state and, hence, has become a flashpoint in the debate on the proper role of 
the federal government.  
Then, in United States v. Lopez,3 the Court began to reassert the 
clause’s limitations on Congress’s regulatory power.4 Lopez held unconsti-
tutional the Gun Free School Zones Act,5 which made it unlawful to possess a 
gun in or near a school, because such possession did not constitute economic 
activity.6 The Lopez case marked the first time since the 1930s that the Court 
struck down a federal law as exceeding Congress’s commerce power.  
Post Lopez, there was a tenable argument that the decision signaled a 
“turning point” in which the Court would invite reconsideration of its lenient, 
rational-basis level review7 of Congress’s exploits under the commerce power.8 
However, a few years later in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court upheld the appli-
																																								 																				
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulated Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
2 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 554 (2012) [hereinafter 
NFIB] (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (acknowledging that “Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause has of course expanded with the growth of the national economy”); Cantor v. Detroit 
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605-06 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (indicating 
that the Court “has recognized a greatly expanded Commerce Clause power”); Craig L. Jackson, 
The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New Deal Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 11, 14 (2012) (explaining that the Commerce Clause’s “meaning was expanded 
significantly following the realignment of the Supreme Court during Roosevelt’s second term”).   
3 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
4 Jackson, supra note 2, at 19.   
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990). 
6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  
7 Under rational basis review, the Court does not subject regulation to serious scrutiny, but 
merely asks whether the law has a rational purpose. See 16B AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law 
§ 859 (2016) (explaining that “rational basis review requires only that the classification be 
rational but does not require that it be the fairest or best means that could have been used”). 
8 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited & Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 753 (1995).  
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cation of federal drug laws to homegrown marijuana, which was allowed under 
state law for medicinal purpose and not intended for sale.9 In particular, the 
unwillingness of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, both members of the Lopez 
majority, to reexamine the validity of post-New Deal commerce doctrine, 
through their joining of the Raich majority, signaled that the Court was not yet 
ready to begin readopting more traditional approaches to the clause.10 
 However, with the recent passing of Justice Scalia, the subsequent 
appointment of Justice Gorsuch, the retirement of Justice Kennedy, and the 
possibility that Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer will leave the Court in the 
coming years, big changes could be in store for commerce doctrine. Justice 
Thomas has made known his desire to revisit the Court’s understanding of 
Congress’s commerce power.11 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito appear 
willing to entertain a narrowing of the commerce doctrine.12 And Justice 
Gorsuch has expressed strong concern about the overreach of federal power—
even though possible remedies would upend basic doctrines of modern 
administrative law.13 
 Originalism holds that the Constitution’s text should be understood as 
it was at the time of its adoption.14 For Commerce Clause doctrine, originalism 
would mandate that only trade of tangible goods between two or more states 
could be federally regulated.15 By removing many areas of economic activity, 
such as manufacturing, from the ambit of federal control, a strict originalist 
approach could “plunge America’s legal and economic system into chaos” by 
																																								 																				
9 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  
10 See Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 550 (2006) (asserting that Raich represented a major step 
backward for efforts to limit Congress’s Commerce Power).   
11 See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 707-08 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
substantial effects test used under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original 
meaning of the Constitution).  
12 See infra subsection IV.C.2 (discussing NFIB’s narrow reading of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause); see also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (discussing how the Commerce 
Clause at minimum requires that activity affect interstate commerce).  
13 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151-58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring) (questioning the basis for Chevron deference—where courts read agency 
interpretations of statutes with great deference); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 
948 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act impermissibly delegates unfettered discretion to the 
Attorney General in contravention of Article I’s non-delegation restrictions). 
14 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, 81 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1385, 1385-86 (2014) (arguing that the text of the Constitution should be its sole 
source of interpretation).  
15 See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
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forbidding the federal government much of its current regulatory authority.16 
Given these potential consequences, it would be too much to assume that a 
majority of the Court would erase over half-a-century of precedent in one fell 
swoop.17 These practical concerns appear to leave advocates of a federal 
government truly limited in its regulatory powers without a workable but logi-
cally consistent argument.  
 Two scholars, however, provide an answer that looks primarily to 
originalism, but accommodates key precedents. John McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport have asserted that while originalism should be the norm of consti-
tutional interpretation, the Court can still affirm non-originalist precedents18 
that enjoy supermajoritarian support or strong reliance.19 Supermajoritarianism 
is inherent in our Constitutional order: it is how the Constitution was adopted 
and amended.20 Therefore, if societal consensus has settled around a non-
originalist precedent or if society relies on a precedent so heavily that 
overturning it could impose massive costs, the Court may reaffirm.21  
As Justice Story said, the Constitution’s meaning should not fluctuate. 
To the contrary, “[i]t is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction . . . not 
dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same 
yesterday, to-day, and forever.”22 The Court, as guardian of the Constitution, 
should not hesitate to “temper [its] Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner 
that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the 
original understanding of that Clause.”23 As this Article will argue, McGinnis 
and Rappaport’s approach shows how the Court can restrict the scope of 
Congress’s commerce power without annihilating federal regulatory authority.  
 Part I frames the issue by examining the historical understanding of 
what constituted “commerce” at the founding. The first section reviews semi-
nal cases that have expounded on the clause and then examines the history and 
precedent surrounding the Necessary and Proper Clause, which has often 
bolstered the commerce power. Part I’s analysis will demonstrate that current 
																																								 																				
16 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 715-18 (2002).  
17 See Lee Epstein et al., The Decision to Depart (or Not) from Constitutional Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1146-47 (2015) (noting the 
Roberts Court’s general unwillingness to overtly overrule precedent).  
18 That is, precedents where the Court relied on premises based on something other than the 
original understanding of the Constitution.  
19 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007). 
20 See id. at 385-89 (describing the adoption of the Constitution).   
21 See infra Part II.  
22 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 145 
(1833). 
23 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).   
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doctrine has deviated from the text and history of the Commerce Clause, but 
that an immediate return to the original understanding could be disruptive. As 
a result, Part II examines McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory, which advocates 
for the original understanding to control unless an erroneous precedent enjoys 
supermajoritarian support or substantial reliance. Part III applies McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s theory to Commerce Clause jurisprudence, showing that greater 
restrictions on the commerce power are needed because allowing Congress to 
regulate remote, local activities neither enjoys supermajoritarian consensus nor 
is necessary to prevent catastrophic results.  
Part IV then lays out a manageable and familiar commerce test. The 
result of this Article’s approach is the resurrection of the Commerce Clause’s 
demarcation between national and local commerce. In arriving at this conclu-
sion, this Article shows that a commerce test consistent with history and 
precedent is devisable. The approach proposed here recognizes Congress’s 
authority to regulate most modern commercial transactions, while still honoring 
the bedrock principle that the federal government is one of limited powers.  
 
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE DISTINGUISHES NATIONAL FROM  
LOCAL COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
 
 By giving Congress the power to regulate only commercial transactions 
in the national market, the Commerce Clause was meant to promote federalism 
by denying the federal government the capacity to regulate local matters.24 
However, a strictly originalist reading of the Commerce Clause would preclude 
the federal government from regulating all production activities, including 
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, along with all purely intrastate comer-
cial transactions. Forbidding federal regulation of production of goods and 
services would have serious implications, including the virtual nullification of 
employment regulations, like Title VII, and the regulatory authority of 
important agencies, like the FDA.  
For all of the ink spilled and trees felled on the Commerce Clause, its 
text is quite short. It provides that Congress may “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”25 
The focus of this discussion is Congress’s authority to regulate commerce 
“among the several States.” That Congress can regulate the exchange of 
goods across state lines is universally accepted. The problem arises over what 
constitutes “commerce” and whether purely intrastate activities that somehow 
affect interstate commerce can be regulated.  
																																								 																				
24 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (providing that the Constitution 
requires a distinction as to what is fully national and what is fully local).  
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
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 This Part will set the doctrinal stage by examining the framing era’s 
narrow concept of the term “commerce” and how courts up until the mid-1930s 
applied that understanding. Then follows an examination of the shift in how 
“commerce” was defined. A discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause and 
its role in Commerce Clause jurisprudence follows. Finally, the restrictiveness 
of both clauses’ original understandings leads to the conclusion that attempting 
to roll back Commerce Clause jurisprudence to 1788 could be untenable.  
 
A. The Definition of “Commerce” 
 
The founding generation understood the term “commerce” to mean only 
“trade or exchange of goods.”26 Unlike today, where “commerce” is used to refer 
to any “gainful activity,” the founding generation would not have seen prod-
uction activities, such as manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, as being part 
of commerce.27 The writings of the framers and the purpose behind the creation 
of the Commerce Clause also confirm its intended narrow scope. Many feared a 
centralized government that could assume powers unto itself.28 To assuage these 
concerns, proponents of the Constitution pointed to the many areas of life where 
the federal government would have no authority, including personal property not 
related to commerce, agriculture, and other business enterprises.29 Therefore, it 
																																								 																				
26 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 
104, 112 (2001) (explaining that Commerce may be limited to trade and exchange of goods, 
which would exclude production). Founding era dictionaries described “commerce” as 
“exchange of one thing for another, interchange of anything; trade; traffick.” Raoul Berger, 
Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695, 702 (1996) (quoting 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755)); see also Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“‘[C]ommerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and 
bartering, as well as transportation for these purposes.”); Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope 
of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1393 (1987) (discussing how “commerce,” 
as used in the Constitution’s text, could not refer to manufacturing or agriculture).   
27 Barnett, supra note 26, at 144; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(noting that production is distinct from commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 
U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (stating, “The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another state 
does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce”); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. 
Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal 
Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
101 (1999) (conceding that “commerce” includes only exchange of goods). 
28 See, e.g., LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 6 (1787) (decrying 
the idea of a centralized government that consolidates power at the expense of the states).  
29 See Robert G. Natelson, Tempering the Commerce Power, 68 MONT. L. REV. 95, 117 (2007) 
(“During the ratification process, federalist spokesmen listed all sorts of activities the new 
federal government would not be able to regulate within state boundaries: local government, 
real property, the law of testate and intestate succession, personal property outside of 
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was clear to the founding generation that “interstate commerce” meant exchange 
of goods across state lines, not business transactions in general.  
The purpose of the Commerce Clause was to prevent the state 
protectionism that had doomed the Articles of Confederation.30 Under the 
Articles, the Continental Congress had no authority to prohibit states from 
engaging in protectionist measures, such as tariffs and prohibitions on trade 
with other states.31 Giving Congress full authority over interstate and intern-
ational commerce allowed it to keep states from interfering with the free flow 
of commerce.32 Thus, when interpreting the Commerce Clause, it is important 
to remember that its primary purpose was to protect the free exchange of 
interstate commerce, not to regulate it.33 
 
B. The History of Commerce Clause Precedent 
 
Historical examination shows that the post-New Deal Court’s shift 
regarding what Congress can regulate via the Commerce Clause truly broke with 
tradition.34 Essentially, the jurisprudence can be divided into two categories. The 
first deals with “channels” and “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce.35 
Channels and instrumentalities consist of the various ways that commerce flows 
from seller to buyer such as highways, railroads, and ships. When regulating 
																																								 																				
commerce, agriculture and other business enterprises, domestic relations, most civil disputes, 
most criminal matters, religion, education, and social services.”); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 
17, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he supervision of agriculture 
and of other concerns of similar nature . . . which are proper to be provided for by local 
legislation, can never be desirable cares of general [federal] jurisdiction.”).  
30 See Barnett, supra note 26, at 133-34 (noting how the framers wanted to facilitate trade between 
the states); see also John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of 
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 93 (2004) (discussing the need for 
Congress to protect interstate commerce against the parochial concerns of individual states). 
31 See Brannon P. Denning, Confederation Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce 
and the Legacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L. REV. 37, 39-40 (2005) 
(describing the problem of discriminatory practices used by states against trade with other 
states and the resulting burden on interstate commerce).   
32 See id. (discussing the desire to protect interstate commerce).  
33 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937) (“The fundamental 
principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate 
legislation’ for its ‘protection or advancement.’”). 
34 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 1400 (discussing the New Deal Court’s doctrinal trans-
formation); see also Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power 
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 573 (1995) (dis-
cussing the limited view of early Commerce Clause precedent).  
35 Channels and instrumentalities are often considered two separate categories. But, for the 
purposes of this Article, they are treated as one. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
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channels and instrumentalities, Congress is acting directly according to the 
original purpose of the Commerce Clause by protecting the stream of interstate 
commerce.36  
The second category is “the power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce.”37 This category is where the Court 
has struggled to articulate how and when Congress can regulate activity, particu-
larly intrastate activity.38 A further complication comes from the degree to which 
“substantial effects” cases relied on channels and instrumentalities cases.39 To 
compensate for this complexity, this Section will focus on the doctrinal history 
and highlight where Congress had greater or lesser regulatory authority. The end 
result will show the major break with history that took place in the early 1940s 
by allowing Congress to regulate the most remote, local activities.  
 
1. The Expansiveness of Pre-1937 Commerce Power 
 
Consistent with the framers’ views, the Court’s earliest cases affirmed 
that the main purpose of the Commerce Clause was not to give the federal 
government the police power but to protect the flow of interstate commerce.40 
The first case to interpret the Commerce Clause was Gibbons v. Ogden,41 
which dealt with the grant of a steamship monopoly by New York.42 New 
Jersey, unhappy with the monopoly, took retaliatory action, sparking a heated 
conflict that threatened to disrupt the flow of commerce.43 To resolve the 
dispute, Chief Justice Marshall found that a federal law regulating navigation 
preempted the New York law.44 In asserting Congress’s power to protect the 
stream of interstate commerce, Marshall stated that regulating interstate 
commerce meant regulating traffic in commerce that affected “more States 
than one.”45  
Because Marshall emphasized that federal regulation could prohibit 
activities within a state that interfere with the flow of interstate commerce, many 
have concluded that Marshall blessed the modern belief that Congress can 
																																								 																				
36 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.  
37 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.  
38 Id.  
39 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937) (relying on 
channels and instrumentalities cases).  
40 Regan, supra note 34, at 573.  
41 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
42 Epstein, supra note 26, at 1401.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194.  
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regulate absolutely anything that in some way creates impacts beyond the state’s 
boundaries.46 However, arriving at such a conclusion ignores the context of 
Gibbons. The case dealt purely with protecting the flow of goods through the 
channels and instrumentalities of commerce.47 Further, the idea that Gibbons 
gives Congress authority equivalent to a police power is unsupported by 
Marshall’s own words. Although Congress can regulate commercial activities 
within states’ “jurisdictional lines,” he emphasizes that the “completely internal 
commerce of a State [is] reserved for the State itself.”48 Marshall then went on 
to say that “[c]ommerce among the States must, of necessity, be commerce with 
the States.”49 Therefore, regulatory authority at minimum requires a direct 
connection with the stream of interstate commerce.50 
With the arrival of the Gilded Age and concerns about the power of 
trusts, the Court repeatedly sustained federal antitrust laws against challenges 
because the anti-competitive actions were attempts to restrain and control the 
flow of interstate commerce by making products scarcer.51 The direct impact on 
interstate commerce allowed Congress to regulate the formation of trusts.52 
Further, in the Shreveport Rate Case, the Court reaffirmed Congress’s power to 
reach intrastate activity affecting the flow of interstate commerce.53 Shreveport 
Rate involved discriminatory pricing, where higher rates were imposed on 
																																								 																				
46 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 1401-02 (discussing Professor Lawrence Tribe’s view).  
47 See Regan, supra note 34, at 573 (noting how Gibbons affirmed the federal government’s 
constitutional “interest in unfettered transportation”). Indeed, the Court’s early opinions 
continued to recognize that Congress’s broad authority over the channels and instrumentalities of 
commerce extended to intrastate activities that were part of the stream of interstate commerce. 
See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397-98 (1905) (finding that because 
stockyards are part of the flow of livestock through interstate commerce, they are subject to 
federal regulation); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 565 (1870) (holding that a ship, which traveled 
only within one state, still fell within the commerce power because it could be used to transport 
goods moving in the stream of interstate commerce). 
48 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195.  
49 Id. at 196 (emphasis added).  
50 See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 CHI. 
L. REV. 1090, 1140 (2000) (discussing the need for a formal or logical connection between 
an activity and interstate commerce); see also The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 401 (1849) 
(recognizing that passenger travel fell within Congress’s regulatory authority because of its 
connection to the channels and instrumentalities of commerce).  
51 See Cushman, supra note 50, at 1094-95 (discussing the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence).  
52 See, e.g., United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (noting the direct 
effect that trust collusions have on interstate commerce); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight 
Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 313 (1897) (discussing the direct effect that a trust formation has on 
interstate commerce); see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) 
(noting that federal law can prevent actions that “deprive the public of the advantages which 
flow from free competition”).  
53 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).  
Vol. 3:2]   Originalism and the General Concurrence 
 
 
273 
interstate commerce, as compared to intrastate commerce.54 To eliminate the 
discrimination, the federal government sought to regulate the intrastate rate.55 
The Court held that Congress could validly regulate the intrastate rates because 
of their hindering “effect on interstate commerce.”56 Thus, where intrastate 
activities directly affect the flow of interstate commerce, Congress possesses 
authority to regulate those intrastate activities.57 
Congress’s broad authority over channels and instrumentalities of 
commerce has been well accepted.58 But Congress also had authority to 
regulate the types of goods that were entering the stream of commerce.59 The 
Court also recognized that a contract for a non-resident to perform a service 
across state lines was interstate commerce.60  
Perhaps one of the greatest commerce powers that Congress possessed 
was the ability to prohibit goods from entering the stream of interstate com-
merce.61 For example, in the Lottery Case, the Court concluded that Congress 
had authority to prohibit the sale of lottery tickets across state lines.62 The Court 
later upheld the application of the Food & Drugs Act to a shipment of eggs that 
were intended for baking, not sale to consumers.63 Despite the argument that 
Congress was without authority to regulate “raw material” that was “not 
shipped for sale” to consumers, the Court unanimously affirmed Congress’s 
authority to prohibit shipment of eggs that did not comply with the Food & 
																																								 																				
54 Id. at 346-48.  
55 Id.  
56 Cushman, supra note 50, at 1130; see also Hannibal & St. Johns R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 
U.S. 465, 470 (1877) (“Transportation is essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce 
itself . . . .”); Regan, supra note 34, at 574 (noting that Shreveport Rate and Daniel Ball dealt 
only with channels and instrumentalities of commerce).  
57 See Mobile Cty. v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880) (stating that Congress has broad 
authority to protect the stream of interstate commerce by adopting “measures to promote its 
growth and insure its safety”).  
58 Indeed, if anything, the pre-New Deal Court expanded Congress’s ability to regulate 
channels and instrumentalities of commerce. See Epstein, supra note 26, at 1418 (citing Wis. 
R.R. Comm’n v. Chi., Burlington & Qunicy R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922)); see also United 
States v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 272 U.S. 457, 464 (1926) (holding that “commingling of 
interstate and intrastate commerce” gives Congress the authority to regulate).  
59 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899) (finding that 
Congress could regulate sales of yet-to-be manufactured goods because the contract for 
delivery across state lines was interstate commerce). 
60 York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21, 24-25 (1918). 
61 See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 359 (1903) (citing Congress’s 
ability to preclude the operation of trust contracts under antitrust laws).  
62 See id. at 356 (stating that “the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states 
is plenary”). 
63 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1911).  
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Drugs Act.64 The Court highlighted the government’s interest in pure foods 
and confirmed that items sold to manufacturers “are destined for sale” and 
qualify as interstate commerce.65 Thus, while Congress could not regulate 
production, it could control whether and how goods produced within one state 
would see the light of day in another.  
 
2. Limits the Traditional Doctrine Imposed 
 
Older commerce doctrine left more breathing room for congressional 
regulation than is conventionally believed. However, the Court was not always 
clear and consistent. Despite its holdings in the Lottery Case and Hipolite Egg 
Co., the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart held that Congress could not use the 
prohibitory power to prevent goods made by child labor from traveling through 
interstate commerce.66 Through the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, the Court used the “direct-indirect test.”67 The test looked at whether 
the activity had a direct effect on interstate commerce.68 If there was a direct 
effect, then Congress could validly regulate the activity.69 But where the effect 
of a local activity was only indirect, the Commerce Clause did not grant 
regulatory authority.70  
																																								 																				
64 Id. at 52, 58.  
65 Id. at 54. An additional problem in the case was whether Congress could seize the eggs 
after they had traveled through commerce. See id. at 57 (highlighting the argument that the 
eggs should have been seized in transit, not after they became “part of the general mass of 
property” within a state). However, because Congress has the power to “prevent trade in 
[adulterated items] between the states,” it also could seize the substandard commerce at any 
point, including after exiting the stream of commerce. Id. at 58. 
66 247 U.S. 251, 267 (1918). However, citing the Lottery Case, Justice Holmes dissented and 
argued that the federal government should have been free to use its prohibitory power here 
because “Congress is given power to regulate such commerce in unqualified terms.” Id. at 
277-78.  
67 Note, Production and Commerce Among the States: Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 50 HARV. 
L. REV. 307, 312 (1936).   
68 See, e.g., Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 
185-86 (1906) (finding no direct impact on interstate commerce).  
69 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 52. 
70 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895) (finding that a monopoly 
covering only a few local operations did not directly affect interstate commerce). Even well 
into the 1930s, the Court continued to hold unanimously that Congress could not reach the 
slaughtering of chickens destined for intrastate consumers based on the indirect effect the 
sales would have on aggregate commerce. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-43, 548 (1935) (emphasizing that “the distinction between direct 
and indirect effects . . . must be recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance 
of our constitutional system”). Indeed, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, argued 
that the direct-indirect test must be maintained. Otherwise, if Congress can “reach all 
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Perhaps the biggest impediment to Congress’s authority was the notion 
that Congress could not regulate agriculture, mining, or manufacturing.71 
Further, Congress’s regulatory authority ceased when a good exited interstate 
commerce.72 Once commerce moved from a national to a local market, “its 
interstate character” melded “into the domestic stocks of the state which are 
beyond the powers of Congress.”73  
The final triumph of traditional commerce doctrine came with the 
Carter Coal case, where the Court held that merely because an article might be 
destined for sale in another state, Congress does not have the power to regulate 
its production.74 The Court insisted that “[p]roduction is not commerce; but a 
step in the preparation for commerce.”75 However, Chief Justice Hughes 
argued that the Court should have sustained the regulation because most of the 
coal was destined for interstate commerce.76 But, he also reiterated that Con-
gress could not gain control over activities indirectly affecting commerce 
without “subvert[ing] the fundamental principle[s] of the Constitution.”77 
Chief Justice Hughes would play a critical role in transitioning the Court away 
from the traditional commerce doctrine.78  
																																								 																				
enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate 
commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, 
and the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of 
the federal government.” Id. at 546.  
71 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 1398 (discussing how Congress could not reach production 
activities); Berger, supra note 26, at 702-03 (arguing that agriculture is not covered by the 
Commerce Clause); see also Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275-76 (refusing to allow Congress to 
reach mining and manufacturing because production activities were inherently local and 
belonged exclusively to the states).  
72 Although Hipolite Egg Co. had held that Congress could reach prohibited articles that had 
slipped through interstate commerce, Congress still had no authority to continue regulating 
products that legitimately passed through the stream of commerce after their exit. See A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp., 296 U.S. at 543 (discussing how once a good leaves the stream of 
interstate commerce and “come[s] to a permanent rest within the state,” the good is then 
beyond the reach of federal regulation). 
73 United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand, 
J., concurring), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
74 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936) (“Though intended for exportation, 
they may never be exported; the owner has a perfect right to change his mind . . . .” (quoting 
Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 526 (1886))). 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 320 (Hughes, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
77 Id. at 318.  
78 For a fascinating discussion on Chief Justice Hughes’ view of the Commerce Clause and 
his misgivings about the Court’s eventual disregard of the traditional commerce doctrine, see 
Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court 
and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1960-67 (1994). 
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3. The 1937 Changes and Attempts to Delineate Interstate Versus 
Local Activity 
 
1937 marked a watershed year in the Court’s history; the Court recog-
nized that regulation of manufacturing could be reached directly through the 
Commerce Clause.79 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Chief Justice 
Hughes, writing for the Court, upheld a collective bargaining regulation 
directed at factory workers.80 Although the Court acknowledged that manufac-
turing was intrastate in nature, Congress nonetheless had the power to regulate 
it if there was “such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce 
that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from 
burdens and obstructions.”81 While this recognition was a step beyond the 
traditional commerce doctrine that precluded regulation of manufacturing, 
Chief Justice Hughes was careful to tie the authority to the stream of interstate 
commerce.82 Because the products were destined for the stream of interstate 
commerce,83 Congress could validly regulate the factory.84 
While Jones & Laughlin Steel marked a turning point in the Court’s 
history, the opinion itself was far from a total break with the past. The Court 
continued to apply the direct-indirect test, justifying its holding on the direct 
impact of manufacturing on the stream of interstate commerce.85 Indeed, the 
Court recognized that the federal action must respect “our dual system of 
government” and not extend “to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so 
indirect and remote that to embrace them . . . would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.”86 Thus, because of the opinion’s recognition of the 
																																								 																				
79 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 1421 (discussing the change in the understanding regarding 
the “stream of commerce”). 
80 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1937).  
81 Id. at 37 (emphasis added).  
82 See id. at 36-37 (citing the Daniel Ball and Kimball).  
83 Indeed, the statute itself included a jurisdictional nexus, directing the regulations only at 
factories “affecting commerce.” Id. at 24; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 
(1995) (noting the requirement for a “nexus to interstate commerce”).  
84 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 43.  
85 See id. at 41 (“We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and 
to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. Because 
there may be but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a 
host of local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial 
activities do not have such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make 
the presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern.”). 
86 Id. at 37 (emphasis added).  
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need to delineate direct from indirect effects, Jones & Laughlin Steel looks 
more like the Lottery Case and Hipolite Egg Co. than the Court’s later cases.87  
Throughout the remainder of the 1930s, the Court continued applying 
the direct-indirect test, with the added recognition that production activities 
targeting interstate commerce could be considered to have a direct effect.88 The 
Court recognized that when producers and sellers target both interstate and 
intrastate markets, availing one’s products to the interstate market then gave 
the federal government authority to regulate all of the business’s sales and 
production.89 However, the Court’s balanced approach of holding that pro-
ducers who target interstate commerce could be regulated, while still 
recognizing a distinct class of purely intrastate activity, would not last long. By 
the late 1930s, new Justices had flooded the Court ready to engraft New Deal 
thinking into constitutional jurisprudence.90 
The first cracks in the direct-indirect test appeared in 1939 when the 
Court began robustly applying channels and instrumentalities doctrine to sales 
of products.91 This proved problematic. Channels and instrumentalities cases had 
used broad language describing Congress’s wide latitude to protect the flow of 
interstate commerce.92 Hence, it was a misunderstanding to read cases like 
Shreveport Rate as stating a broader proposition that Congress had a general 
commerce authority to regulate any intrastate activity when there was no 
interference with the flow of commerce.93 Nonetheless, by 1939, the Court was 
finding that because sales of intrastate goods were competing with sales of goods 
in interstate commerce, Congress could reach and regulate sales of all goods of 
a given type.94 Then, in 1942, the Court held that a dairy seller, who did not offer 
interstate dairy products, could be regulated because his intrastate milk competed 
																																								 																				
87 Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277-78 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(applying the Lottery Case), with Natelson, supra note 29, at 124 (discussing the Court’s ultimate 
break with traditional doctrine in 1942).  
88 See Cushman, supra note 50, at 1136 (discussing Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), and 
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939)).  
89 See, e.g., Currin, 306 U.S. at 11 (“The fact that intrastate and interstate transactions are 
commingled on the tobacco market does not frustrate or restrict the congressional power to protect 
and control what is committed to its own care.”). 
90 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 1451-52 (discussing the Court’s transition); see also Cushman, 
supra note 50, at 1136-37 (noting the change in jurisprudential thinking).  
91 See Cushman, supra note 50, at 1136 (discussing cases on the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 and highlighting the Court’s use of Shreveport Rate’s intrastate competition doctrine).  
92 See id. at 1130 (noting that then-Justice Hughes had based his reasoning squarely in channels 
and instrumentalities jurisprudence).  
93 Id.  
94 See id. at 1136 (discussing United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939); 
H.P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939)). 
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with milk in interstate commerce.95 As the Court drifted from the understanding 
that production directed at the stream of interstate commerce could be regulated, 
to a more lenient standard giving Congress the power to regulate all products 
that have interstate markets, the stage was set for the Court’s final repudiation of 
any real limitations on Congress’s commerce power.  
 
4. Wickard and the Total Break with the Past 
 
By growing surplus wheat that he planned to use for his own consum-
ption, Roscoe Filburn did not comply with a mandate under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act.96 In hearing Filburn’s Commerce Clause challenge, the Court 
faced a pivotal question: Did Congress have the authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate consumption of homegrown wheat that would not enter any 
stream of commerce, local or national? After all, the framers had repeatedly 
promised that personal property and agriculture could never be reached by 
federal regulation.97 
Justice Jackson, the author of Wickard v. Filburn,98 was not naive to 
the importance of this case. While Jackson firmly believed that production 
could be regulated, he thought the homegrown wheat could “neither [be] 
interstate nor commerce.”99 Jackson had initially drafted two opinions, each 
remanding the case for further factual findings.100 His concerns stemmed from 
basic constitutional order. As he wrote to Chief Justice Stone: 
 
The Constitution drew a line between state and federal power 
and here the Congress wants to cross that line admittedly. I 
suppose that before we give it our approval there must be some 
																																								 																				
95 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942). Another facet of change 
was that the Court began to take Congress’s findings of impact on interstate commerce “at face 
value.” Epstein, supra note 26, at 1451. This leniency would pave the way for the Court to retreat 
from “its position as a check upon Congressional action under the commerce clause.” Recent 
Decisions: Constitutional Law—Effect of Competition of Intrastate Commerce on Interstate 
Commerce as Justifying Regulation of Former, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 694, 699 (1942). 
96 Cushman, supra note 50, at 1138. 
97 See Natelson, supra note 29, at 117 (discussing the history of the ratification debate).  
98 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
99 Cushman, supra note 50, at 1138 (quoting private correspondence from Justice Jackson to 
Chief Justice Stone).  
100 See id. (“The constitutional issue involved is of the greatest magnitude, and we are of 
opinion that we should not pass upon it in the present state of the record, without the benefit 
of findings and consideration by the court below or a full presentation of the controlling 
economic facts relied upon.”).  
 
Vol. 3:2]   Originalism and the General Concurrence 
 
 
279 
finding that it is warranted by facts and conditions. Otherwise, 
the federal compact was pretty meaningless if Congress is to be 
sole judge of the extent of its own commerce power.101 
 
 In the final draft of his opinion that would have remanded the case, 
Jackson concluded that the factual findings were insufficient to answer the con-
cern of whether Congress’s action would “effectively obliterate the distinction 
between what is national (and what is local) and create a completely centralized 
government.”102 Despite the opinion’s garnering five votes, it was decided that 
Wickard would be slated for re-argument the following fall.103 Over the 
summer, Jackson pondered the crossroads at which the Court stood. Because 
the direct-indirect test had come to be a measure of purely economic effect, 
Jackson believed that crafting a judicial test would be impossible.104 Thus, 
since economic policy is for the legislature, not the courts, Jackson concluded 
that courts should defer to Congress’s determination that an activity affected 
interstate commerce.105 
 Jackson’s majority opinion in Wickard is now the current formulation 
for when a law is sustainable under the Commerce Clause: whether Congress 
can rationally conclude, in the aggregate, that a given activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce.106 The Wickard test provides rational-basis level 
review107 and looks to aggregate activity. Even though the economic effect of 
farmer Filburn’s homegrown wheat consumption was negligible, if enough peo-
ple likewise grew their own wheat, the economic effects would start to add up.108 
Hence, Congress can reach individual cases to protect against aggregate effects.  
 It cannot be denied that Wickard stands as a repudiation of the Comm-
erce Clause’s original public meaning.109 Jackson himself later conceded that 
Wickard essentially obliterated any restraint on the federal government’s regul-
																																								 																				
101 Id. at 1140.  
102 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1141-42.  
105 See id. at 1143 (“It is perhaps time that we recognize that the introduction of economic 
determinism into constitutional law of interstate commerce marked the end of judicial control 
of the scope of federal activity.”).  
106 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).  
107 See supra note 7 (defining rational basis review).  
108 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.  
109 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing 
how far afield Wickard’s “substantial effects test” is from the original understanding of the 
Commerce Clause); Epstein, supra note 26, at 1450 (noting that in Wickard, “the entire issue 
of enumerated powers and state autonomy disappeared from view”); Natelson, supra note 
29, at 124-25 (discussing the aggregation principle).  
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atory authority, writing: “I suspect what we would say is that in any case where 
Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate commerce, the Court will accept 
that judgment.”110 It would be decades before the Court once again recognized 
a limit on the commerce power, as applied against individuals, in Lopez.  
 Today, the basic framework of Wickard’s substantial effects test 
remains.111 The Court has, however, clarified that the activity must be an “econ-
omic activity.”112 Thus, the Court has increasingly affirmed that the Commerce 
Clause does not give Congress the police power “to regulate an individual from 
cradle to grave.”113 But these recently recognized limitations are nothing 
compared to the level of protections for personal liberty granted under the 
traditional doctrine.  
 As is now obvious, Commerce Clause jurisprudence has moved far 
beyond the clause’s original meaning. However, an added complexity to the 
doctrine is the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, many of the decisions 
discussed above utilized that clause to reach intrastate activity.114 Since the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is often used to justify intrusions beyond the 
scope of the Commerce Clause alone, it too deserves some attention.115 
 
C. The Necessary and Proper Clause as Vesting Congress with 
Incidental Authority to Enforce the Commerce Clause 
 
Congress often uses the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach intrastate 
activities that interfere with its regulation of interstate commerce.116 The clause 
simply states that Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers.”117 Because of the 
clause’s perceived expansive power, it has been used to justify extensions of 
																																								 																				
110 Cushman, supra note 50, at 1146 (quoting a letter from Justice Jackson).  
111 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-19 (2005) (discussing and applying Wickard).  
112 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.  
113 NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  
114 See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58-59 (1911) (recognizing that 
the seizure of illegally shipped eggs after they left the stream of commerce was allowable 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to further Congress’s end of keeping them out of 
interstate commerce).  
115 See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 548 (summarizing the argument that forcing individuals to 
enter the healthcare market was allowable under the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
116 See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the clause “empowers 
Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its 
authority to enact in isolation”); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 
(1942) (holding that Congress could regulate intrastate milk markets because of their effects 
on interstate commerce). 
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence.118 Understanding the history of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is important in knowing how the framing 
generation envisioned its use. As the following discussion will show, the 
operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause is too narrow to support the 
Court’s holdings in cases like Wickard and Raich.  
According to its original understanding, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause only gives Congress the ability to execute its enumerated powers, not 
to create new ones.119 Essentially, the Necessary and Proper Clause acts as a 
grant of incidental authority, a power equivalent to a principal-agent 
relationship.120 Understanding the clause in an agency-fiduciary context, with 
the sovereign People as principal and the federal government as agent, begets 
two significant implications. First, it provides a mechanism for interpreting the 
clause—it can be read against the backdrop of eighteenth century agency 
																																								 																				
118 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing how the New Deal era Court used the clause 
to reach intrastate activities); see also Somin, supra note 10, at 530-31 (criticizing Justice 
Scalia’s understanding of how the clause validates congressional regulation of homegrown 
marijuana in his Raich concurrence). Examples of Congress citing the aggregate effects of 
an activity and need to reach intrastate activities through the Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses are legion. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 2 (2007) (finding that hate 
crimes substantially affect interstate commerce); S. REP. NO. 103-117, at 31 (1993) (stating 
that both the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses allow Congress to restrict the 
blocking of abortion clinics because of the impact on interstate commerce); S. REP. NO. 90-
724, at 9 (1967) (asserting that Congress should have authority to license clinical laboratories 
that receive specimens through interstate commerce because of the lack of uniformity among 
the states). 
119 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 185 (2003) (emphasizing how the Framers “insisted that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause was not an additional freestanding grant of power, but merely made 
explicit what was already implicit in the grant of each enumerated power”); Natelson, supra 
note 29, at 101 (citing arguments in ratification debates stating that the clause “gives no new 
power, but declares that those already given are to be executed by proper laws”); Somin, 
supra note 10, at 534 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding of the clause); see 
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819) (“Should congress, in the execution 
of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, 
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not 
intrusted [sic] to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a 
case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the 
land.”); Barnett, supra note 119, at 215 (citing Chief Justice Marshall’s writings). 
120 See Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
55 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 243, 322 (2004) (discussing how the “overwhelming weight 
of evidence” from the founding era shows that the “purpose was to serve as a rule of 
construction,” giving the government incidental powers to carry out its enumerated rights); 
see also Barnett, supra note 119, at 217-18 (describing the principal-agent relationship 
inherent in the clause).  
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law.121 Second, it places limits on how the federal government can operate by 
recognizing that the principal, the sovereign People, have retained rights for 
themselves that Congress cannot appropriate.122  
The idea that the Necessary and Proper Clause functions like similar 
clauses in fiduciary documents is not new—the notion pervaded early-American 
thinking. Edmund Randolph, one of the clause’s drafters, said that it was meant 
to include the agency law “doctrine of implied incidental powers” within the Con-
stitution.123 This incorporation of agency principles would ensure that Congress 
had full authority to undertake whatever was needed to execute its enumerated 
powers.124 However, the incidental authority would be objectively limited; Cong-
ress would need to show that exercise of power under the clause was incidental—
that is merely “the natural means of executing a power.”125 And, since the grant 
of incidental authority was objective, Congress would not have discretion to deter-
mine “the scope of [its] agency” authority.126 For if Congress went beyond its 
given authority, it was “within the province of the Judiciary to annul the law.”127 
Because the clause grants only incidental authority, Congress is limited 
to enforcing its enumerated powers, as necessary and proper.128 Therefore, 
Congress must exercise care not to impose itself into areas where it has no auth-
ority.129 This conclusion is consistent with views of those who advocated for the 
Constitution’s adoption. Alexander Hamilton, a framer known for his more 
expansive views of federal power, assured that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
was “only declaratory of a truth” that Congress had the power to authorize what-
																																								 																				
121 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2010).  
122 Barnett, supra note 119, at 217-18.  
123 Natelson, supra note 120, at 272; see also Gary Lawson & Patricia Granger, The “Proper” 
Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 
267, 282 (1993) (discussing Randolph’s affirmation that Congress could not use the clause to 
assert authority beyond its enumerated powers).  
124 See Natelson, supra note 120, at 252 (noting how the inclusion of incidental powers was a distin-
guishing feature from the Articles of Confederation, which did not provide incidental authority).  
125 Id. at 282.  
126 Barnett, supra note 119, at 218; see also Lawson & Granger, supra note 123, at 276 
(“[T]he clause does not explicitly designate Congress as the sole judge of the necessity and 
propriety of executory laws.”); Miller, supra note 121, at 7-10 (showing how the clause failed 
to include discretionary language which would have given Congress the ability to decide if 
something was necessary and proper).  
127 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1988 (1791) (statement of Representative Smith). 
128 See Gary Lawson et al., The Fiduciary Foundation of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 415, 431 (2014) (providing that Marshall was referring to incidental authority in McCulloch).  
129 See JOSEPH GALES, THE DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
1947 (1834) (James Madison) (“[T]he natural and obvious force of the terms and the context, be 
limited to means necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers.”).  
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ever incidental actions were needed to effectuate its “certain specified powers.”130 
While the “national legislature [may] pass all necessary and proper laws,” it 
must base its authority to act “in the specific powers” granted via Article I.131 
Far from disparaging this limited view of the Necessary and Proper 
power, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland132 heartily 
affirms that legitimate action under the clause will only be incidental in 
nature.133 McCulloch dealt with whether Congress had the authority to charter 
a national bank.134 The Court, through Marshall’s opinion, held that Congress 
had such authority per the Necessary and Proper Clause.135 But Marshall used 
basic agency-law notions to reach his conclusion.  
In McCulloch, Marshall dedicates seven pages136 to discussing how the 
power of chartering a bank is subordinate to “those expressly enumerated in the 
Constitution,” before ever mentioning the Necessary and Proper Clause.137 How-
ever, if the clause was just a flexible, open-ended grant of power, then this exten-
ded discussion of why Congress’s action was anchored in an enumerated Article 
I power was useless. But when the clause is understood as an agency-law rule of 
construction, granting merely incidental authority, such a discussion was neces-
sary to prove that the action was legitimate.138 Incidental authority cannot be 
justified on its own terms; it must be in furtherance of expressly granted power.139 
Only after establishing that an action is subordinate to an enumerated power, 
does Marshall then move to a discussion of whether it is necessary or proper.140  
																																								 																				
130 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also Natelson, supra note 120, at 247 (explaining the clause’s function as a grant of implied 
incidental authority). 
131 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 130, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
132 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
133 See Lawson et al., supra note 128, at 432-33 (“Marshall recognized the Necessary and Proper 
Clause for what it was: a variation of a clause, very commonly found in agency agreements, that 
communicated to the reader that the parties were not opting out of the usual rules of incidental 
authority.”).  
134 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 401.  
135 See id. at 416-17 (categorizing the power to establish a bank as a subordinate because Congress 
had authority to prevent counterfeiting, coin money, and raise money for government operations).  
136 Id. at 413-21. 
137 Lawson et al., supra note 128, at 432.  
138 See id. at 433 (discussing the usual rules of incidental authority in the context of McCulloch); 
see also, Miller, supra note 121, at 16 (noting that agency law required close fit between means 
and ends when the term “necessary” is used).  
139 Natelson, supra note 120, at 277-80; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 130, at 203-
04 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always be 
determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded.”). 
140 In contrast, Wickard approaches the Necessary and Proper Clause as an open-ended grant 
of authority where Congress’s action requires no showing of an objective fit between the 
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Further, even though an action falls within incidental authority, it is not 
necessarily legitimate. As Marshall states, the law must be “calculated to effect 
any of the objects intrusted [sic] to the government.”141 Determining the scope 
of authority under the clause requires an understanding of the structural limit-
ations placed on the federal government’s power.142 Thus, a law that undermines 
constitutional structure cannot survive as necessary and proper.143 
The result of interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause according to 
its original public meaning and how it was understood in McCulloch is that Cong-
ress in no way has the discretion to decide the scope of its authority. While courts 
will not question whether Congress’s action is the best choice, they must nonethe-
less subject actions taken under incidental authority to real scrutiny.144 Therefore, 
under an originalist approach, cases granting Congress rational-basis level review 
of its actions through the Necessary and Proper Clause are wrongly decided.145 
 
D. The Resulting Vacuum of Federal Authority 
 
Returning to the original understanding of the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause would effectively require the “dismantling of 
large portions of the modern federal government.”146 Many popular federal 
programs relating to wage, labor, and antidiscrimination in employment would 
be called into question.147 But at its core, Wickard is a problematic interpret-
																																								 																				
enumerated power and the action taken. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (citing 
McCulloch as part of its justification for granting Congress rational-basis level authority to decide 
whether intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce). 
141 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423. 
142 See Berger, supra note 26, at 696-97 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 130, at 202 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (stating that structural limitations will set the boundaries for operation under the 
clause); cf. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 30, at 90 (discussing the important role of courts in 
enforcing the Constitution’s structural provisions).  
143 See NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“[W]e have also carried out 
our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of 
government established by the Constitution.”). 
144 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423 (stating that while courts will not “inquire into the degree of [a 
law’s] necessity,” they must still ensure that Congress does not “under the pretext of executing its 
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted [sic] to the government”).  
145 See Natelson, supra note 120, at 322 (“[E]nforcing the original meaning of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause would require a higher standard of judicial review than courts currently apply to 
federal spending and economic legislation.”).  
146 Epstein, supra note 26, at 1455; see also Jackson, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing the possible 
effects of rolling back post-1937 commerce jurisprudence).  
147 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 1455 (noting “the enormous reliance interests that have 
been created” by such programs).  
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ation of both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. It 
goes beyond the original understanding of the Commerce Clause by allowing 
government regulation to reach agriculture and other production activities.148 
And, Wickard’s Necessary and Proper Clause reasoning grants Congress the 
authority to determine the scope of its own power, undermining basic constitu-
tional notions of a federal government with specific and limited powers.149 
Overruling Wickard should be an easy case for an originalist.  
The problem becomes what replaces Wickard. Pure originalism would 
automatically preclude regulation of production. Further, as the late 1930s 
cases showed, the Court struggled to maintain a sharp distinction between 
direct-indirect effects on interstate commerce.150 Instead of taking an approach 
that looked to a manufacturer’s or seller’s intent about entering the interstate 
market, direct-indirect decisions focused on aggregate economic impact.151 In 
particular, Wrightwood Dairy’s finding that purely intrastate milk sales directly 
affected interstate commerce basically scuttled the direct-indirect test by 
locking future courts into making judgments about economic impact.152 Thus, 
it is little wonder that Justice Jackson felt that the post-Wrightwood Dairy 
direct-indirect test was unworkable.153 
It would appear that there is no principled way of enforcing a more faith-
ful understanding of the Commerce Clause without effectively dismantling the 
modern administrative state.154 Strict originalism would effectively nullify laws 
such as Title VII and the federal minimum wage, at least as they relate to pro-
ducers and manufacturers.155 Further, because services are not goods or merch-
andise, entire service industries would also not be reachable by federal economic 
																																								 																				
148 See Barnett, supra note 26, at 112 (discussing how production was not considered commerce).  
149 See Lawson & Granger, supra note 123, at 332 (“[A] law regulating the production of 
wheat for home consumption is plainly not ‘proper for carrying into Execution’ the federal 
commerce power.”).  
150 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.  
151 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (refusing to adopt a rule that 
would have looked to the manufacturer’s intentions to introduce something into interstate 
commerce). But see Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 309-10 
(1925) (holding that the intent to restrain interstate commerce allowed for federal regulation).  
152 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1942).  
153 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.  
154 Epstein, supra note 26, at 1455; see also Diane P. Wood, Our 18th Century Constitution 
in the 21st Century World, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1079, 1102-03 (2005) (discussing the potential 
impact of returning to a stricter reading of the Commerce Clause).  
155 Cf., e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1918) (precluding the operation 
of federal child labor laws against mines and factories), overruled in part by United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  
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regulation.156 Even the FDA’s ability to regulate the safe production of food and 
drugs would be called into doubt.157 Hence, Congress’s authority to continue 
regulating important economic activities would be jeopardized.  
However, adopting McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory of entrenched 
precedents can help yield a principled way of accommodating the national 
regulatory role of the federal government while still delineating and protecting 
purely local activity. Such a theory would avoid the harsh consequences of 
rolling back commerce jurisprudence while respecting the basic federalist 
structure of the Constitution.  
 
II. MCGINNIS AND RAPPAPORT’S THEORY OF  
ORIGINALISM AND PRECEDENT 
 
 McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the supermajoritarian process 
creates better constitutional results because it promotes societal consensus in 
producing “long-term [governing] provisions.”158 Thus, they propose that 
when well-established precedent conflicts with the Constitution’s original 
public meaning, the Court can still uphold the precedent if it is consistent with 
supermajoritarian consensus or necessary to avoid enormous societal costs.159 
McGinnis and Rappaport are not the first to recognize the benefits of a super-
majoritarian system; the Constitution itself was designed to ensure against a 
tyranny of the majority by requiring coalition building.160 As today’s bitterly 
partisan environment shows, narrow political majorities do not hesitate to dis-
parage and negate the views of their opponents. The supermajoritarian process 
forces the majority to include minorities, thereby moderating political agendas 
and protecting minority interests.161 Thus, judicial interpretations that subvert 
the Constitution’s supermajoritarian protections162 by allowing bare majorities 
to control the effects of the Constitution are inherently problematic.163 
																																								 																				
156 Barnett, supra note 26, at 127 n.130.  
157 See id. at 144 (discussing how the Commerce Clause’s text and history do not support a 
prohibitory power over domestic commerce). 
158 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 
GEO. L.J. 1693, 1699 (2010). 
159 See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text. 
160 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing how factions would cancel-out 
each other and concurrence would be necessary to bring about constitutional change). 
161 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 158, at 1708. 
162 See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing the procedure for constitutional amendment).  
163 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (allowing Congress, by majority 
action, to decide whether the Commerce Clause’s protection of local activity against federal 
interference applies).  
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 Because the Constitution is framed in a way that requires societal 
consensus for constitutional change, the Court should enforce the original under-
standing of the Constitution’s text.164 If the Court refrained from “updating” the 
Constitution, then citizens would be more involved in the process of consti-
tutional amendment and that process would once again become the norm.165 
Further, allowing five unelected judges to change substantive constitutional 
meaning creates uncertainty and removes the protection of fixed constitutional 
rights.166 Originalism addresses these concerns by affording a methodology that 
cabins judicial interpretation, thereby promoting social consensus building.  
 While originalism provides the benefit of fixed constitutional princi-
ples, requiring societal consensus to make changes, it is not without costs. One 
cost is the lack of protection for stare decisis and the degree to which society 
has become reliant on erroneous precedents.167 However, McGinnis and Rapp-
aport have developed an approach that promotes originalism, while protecting 
important precedents.  
 McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory of precedent offers two ways to affirm 
Commerce Clause precedents that conflict with the Constitution’s original 
understanding. The first method determines if a precedent is “entrenched.”168 It 
looks to whether supermajoritarian consensus has solidified around a precedent. 
The precedent becomes entrenched if its principle is “so strongly supported that 
[it] would be enacted by constitutional amendment if [it] were overturned by the 
courts.”169 Thus, if a judge concludes that a precedent would likely be codified 
as a constitutional amendment if it were overruled, it can be upheld.  
 Judges are competent to determine whether a precedent is entrenched. 
The test is simple, asking whether the issue at the heart of the precedent is either 
settled by societal consensus or controversial. Judges can also err on the side of 
																																								 																				
164 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 158, at 1728 (discussing how the Court frustrates the 
proper working of the constitutional process by substantively changing how the Constitution is 
enforced); see also United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenti from denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining that the Constitution was carefully designed 
to limit the concentration of political power to maximize the protection of individual liberty).  
165 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 158, at 1742-43; see also Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 318 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[I]t 
is not for the Court to amend the Constitution by judicial decision.”).  
166 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 158, at 1739.  
167 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 167, 190-91 (1996) (advocating for the overruling of all non-originalist commerce 
precedent); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (2009) 
(discussing the logical inconsistency in attempting to reconcile precedent with originalism). 
168 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 803, 837 (2009). 
169 Id. at 837.  
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upholding a precedent that, from a Gods-eye perspective, would not achieve 
amendment status for reasons “unrelated to the public’s support for the prin-
ciple.”170 That an amendment might get derailed because of political wrangling 
or systemic inertia should be of no concern.171 So long as strong popular consen-
sus exists to make an amendment plausible, the precedent can be affirmed.172  
 The scope of entrenchment is narrow. The entrenchment includes only 
“the principle that enjoys the consensus of a constitutional amendment”—not 
reasoning, dicta, or controversial assertions.173 Also, entrenched precedents are 
not necessarily precedents that have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Court. 
If a precedent is still controversial, despite re-affirmance, then it has not be-
come entrenched and must be justified on originalist grounds.174 Entrenchment 
also applies only to current precedents. When faced with questions of first 
impression, courts should look to originalism.175 
 An alternative way of upholding erroneous precedent is if overruling 
the precedent would create enormous costs.176 Such costs occur when reliance 
on a precedent has become so heavy that overruling it would cause extremely 
deleterious effects. Good examples of these precedents are the cases that 
upheld Social Security or the validity of paper money.177 Even if those cases 
were wrongly decided as an original matter, overruling them would create such 
“fear, uncertainty, and chaos that . . . would far exceed any benefits from 
returning to the original meaning.”178 Importantly, McGinnis and Rappaport 
note that if the Court began rolling back Commerce Clause precedents in a way 
that “would require the immediate elimination of a vast number of government 
programs,” such precedents would also fall into this category.179 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s approach combines the benefits of origin-
alism by asserting that constitutional protections should not be altered via judi-
cial interpretation, while still providing a mechanism for affirming precedents 
																																								 																				
170 Id. at 839.  
171 Id. 
172 McGinnis and Rappaport cite Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as 
paradigmatic of an entrenched precedent. Because the precedent is widely accepted and no 
appreciable political divide exists on the desirability of its holding, it should be retained due 
to its supermajoritarian support. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 158, at 837-39.  
173 Id. at 840.  
174 See id. at 841 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as an example of a precedent 
that, while reaffirmed, is not entrenched because the level of controversy surrounding it 
would preclude it from becoming a constitutional amendment). 
175 Id. at 834.  
176 Id. at 836.  
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 837. 
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on which civil order is now built.180 It forces judges to analyze whether to 
accept or reject precedent based on objective, external factors rather than 
ideology.181 As the past century shows, the federal government has grown 
exponentially.182 This growth has undermined the federalist national-local 
distinction embedded in the Commerce Clause.183 It also raises concerns about 
whether sufficient checks are in place to protect individual liberty and auto-
nomy.184 As the next Part demonstrates, courts must develop some means of 
enforcing the structural protection granted to purely local activity.185  
 
III. APPLYING MCGINNIS AND RAPPAPORT’S THEORY DEMONSTRATES  
A NEED TO PLACE REAL RESTRICTIONS ON  
CONGRESS’S COMMERCE POWER 
  
Under McGinnis and Rappaport’s approach, as applied in this Article, 
Congress may continue to regulate production activities directly linked to 
interstate commerce. But the Court can draw a distinction between purely intra-
state activities and activities involving interstate commerce. In addition to 
raising the concern about the potential effects of a full-blown return to the 
original understanding,186 McGinnis and Rappaport have commented favor-
ably on the Court’s more recent approaches. Specifically, they argue that Lopez 
is correctly decided because it “did not disturb the precedent that gave 
																																								 																				
180 They also provide a third method to protect “corrective precedents,” which corrected 
“supermajoritarian failures”—the exclusion of racial minorities and women. Id. at 841. Aside 
from a few commerce precedents used to extend the Civil Rights Act, see infra note 213, this 
category is most useful in protecting Fourteenth Amendment precedent. 
181 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 839. 
182 See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of 
American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2011) (discussing the growth in federal 
regulatory power since the founding).  
183 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (explaining how structural provisions like the Commerce Clause are meant to 
protect against Congress’s “underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint”); see also New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution protects us from our own 
best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government 
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an 
expedient solution to the crisis of the day.”).  
184 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (“In the tension between federal and 
state power lies the promise of liberty.”). 
185 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (stating that Congress 
cannot be allowed to gain control over purely local activity, lest the dual system of 
government be effectively obliterated); McGinnis & Somin, supra note 30, at 114 
(highlighting Morrison as a step in the right direction).   
186 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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Congress plenary power over core economic matters, like regulation of manu-
facturing, labor, and production.”187 Lopez avoided the “substantial disruption” 
that would have occurred if the Court took a strictly originalist approach.188 
And, Lopez was consistent with the “consensus that the federal government 
should have at least some powers over economic matters that an originalist 
reading of the Commerce Clause might well deny.”189 While Lopez did not 
disturb modern views of economic regulation, McGinnis and Rappaport 
recognized that “there is no similar consensus to allow the federal government 
control over the noncommercial matters.”190 Thus, Lopez’s trimming back the 
post-New Deal idea of plenary federal regulatory power was proper.191  
While McGinnis and Rappaport’s Lopez discussion does not provide a 
fully developed approach to the Commerce Clause, it highlights the touchstones 
of their theory on precedent. There was no supermajoritarian consensus 
supporting plenary federal regulatory power and the decision in Lopez did not 
impose potentially catastrophic changes. Hence, the Commerce Clause’s 
original meaning, allowing only for regulation of economic activities, was never 
displaced. As discussed below, McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory shows that 
only the idea of commerce being limited to sale of goods has been displaced. 
This Article will conclude that the clause’s delineation between national and 
local commerce should be reasserted.   
 
A. Wickard’s Holding Could Not Become Codified as a  
Constitutional Amendment 
 
The role of the federal government in the lives of ordinary Americans 
is a perennial political question. It is far from settled that the federal government 
has the authority to regulate absolutely anything.192 When asked whether there 
is too much federal regulation of all business and industry, not just small 
businesses, about forty percent to fifty percent of Americans say there is too 
much.193 In 2009, fifty-seven percent of respondents said that the “government 
																																								 																				
187 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 852. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 852; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
45 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Constitution “does not tolerate 
reasoning” that would give Congress “authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power”); McGinnis & Somin, supra note 30, at 112 (arguing that a stricter reading of 
the clause protects states’ ability to address local issues, allowing citizens to enjoy more 
tailored approaches).  
193 POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/business.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
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is taking on too much responsibility for solving the nation’s problems” and 
forty-five percent said that the government is “over-regulating business.”194 
Likewise, a recent Gallup poll showed that thirty-five percent of Americans 
want a “less active” federal government.195 And more recently, sixty-four 
percent of respondents said that state and local governments are better equipped 
to handle problems, including sixty-one percent of women and forty-eight 
percent of Democrats.196 
As numbers like these indicate, the notion that the federal government 
should be able to regulate absolutely anything is not an entrenched principle 
enjoying supermajoritarian consensus. But Wickard allows the federal govern-
ment to regulate any activity that Congress rationally concludes, in the 
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. As Justice Jackson 
himself conceded, that formulation basically means the federal government can 
regulate anything and the Court will accept Congress’s justifications.197  
If the question of Wickard’s failure to delineate between interstate and 
intrastate commerce came squarely before the Court, it would be a good candi-
date for overruling under McGinnis and Rappaport’s approach. As the above 
polling data shows, anywhere from a majority to a plurality of Americans are 
wary of federal regulation. If an amendment codifying the scope of Congress’s 
regulatory authority under Wickard was proffered today, it would not have the 
consensus needed for passage and would likely fail. Further, as Part I 
demonstrates, Wickard is inconsistent with the Constitution’s text and history. 
With neither supermajoritarian consensus nor support from the Commerce 
Clause’s original public meaning, Wickard should not be retained. 
But the tricky question of what would replace Wickard arises. 
Returning to the original understanding of the Commerce Clause would likely 
spell the end of many federal programs and policies on which Americans now 
rely—such as the FDA and Title VII, to name just a few. But Wickard is not 
																																								 																				
194 Frank Newport, Americans More Likely to Say Government Is Doing Too Much, GALLUP 
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/123101/americans-likely-say-government-do 
ing-toomuch.aspx. The same fifty-seven percent figure showed up again in 2010 when 
respondents were asked if there was too much regulation of business. Frank Newport, Ameri-
cans Leary of Too Much Gov’t Regulation of Business, GALLUP (Feb. 2, 2010), http:// 
www.gallup.com/poll/125468/americans-leery-govt-regulation-business.aspx. 
195 Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Remain Divided on Preference for Gov’t Activity, GALLUP 
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/177422/americans-remain-divided-preference 
-gov-activity.aspx.  
196 Nancy Cook, Americans Give Up on Washington, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/americans-give-up-on-washington/425319/.  
197 See Cushman, supra note 110 and accompanying text (arguing that in any case where 
Congress believes there is an effect on interstate commerce, the Court will accept that 
judgment). 
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the precedent needed to sustain such programs. Instead, the pivotal case for 
upholding those regulations is Jones & Laughlin Steel. Thus, so long as Jones 
& Laughlin Steel remains in place, overruling Wickard would not impose sever 
societal costs.  
 
B. Jones & Laughlin Steel’s Allowing Congress to Regulate  
Production Activities Is Sustainable Under McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s Approach 
 
Most people today consider “commerce” to be business activities in 
general, not just the trade of goods.198 However, under a pure originalist 
approach to the Commerce Clause, manufacturers and service providers would 
be exempt from federal regulation. Not only would this break with today’s 
understanding of what is considered commercial; it could also potentially 
require the dismantling of many federal regulatory programs. Both results are 
unnecessary under McGinnis and Rappaport’s intermediate approach. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel is the linchpin between the idea of a Commerce 
Clause distinguishing national from local, while allowing Congress to reach 
production and service. The case can be affirmed under both of McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s precedent justifications. First, many popular programs rely on 
Congress’s ability to reach production activities. Overruling Jones & Laughlin 
Steel would nullify federal minimum wage laws, occupational safety standards, 
Title VII, and other employment programs, at least as they relate to the 
agriculture, manufacturing, and service industries. But considering the broad 
acceptance of these programs and the general notion that Congress can regulate 
production, a judge could conclude that Jones & Laughlin Steel’s holding 
enjoys supermajoritarian consensus. 
Second, even if there was doubt about whether Jones & Laughlin Steel 
enjoys consensus, undermining or overruling it could have enormous costs. 
Not only would employment regulations cease to apply to some of the largest 
segments of the workforce, but also any federal regulatory scheme targeting pro-
duction would be annulled. Thus, various product-safety standards would be 
called into question. Because of society’s reliance on Jones & Laughlin Steel’s 
																																								 																				
198 See Commerce, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster. 
com/dictionary/commerce (defining “commerce” as “activities that relate to the buying or 
selling of goods and services” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 587-88 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the difference between the founding 
generation’s understanding of “commerce” and today’s understanding); Barnett, supra note 
26, at 104; cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 158, at 1743-45 (discussing how the 
political situation in 1936 likely would have led to constitutional amendments expanding 
Congress’s commerce power). 
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allowing the commerce power to reach production destined for interstate mar-
kets and the potentially massive disruption that would be caused by its undoing, 
the precedent should be upheld. 
While society may have come to rely on Congress’s power to reach 
production, the Commerce Clause should not be relegated to constitutional sur-
plusage. Jones & Laughlin Steel itself went to great pains to affirm that the 
Commerce Clause still enforced a distinction between national and local 
activity.199 Thus, courts should recognize a distinction between purely local 
activity that is not directed at multistate markets and interstate commerce.  
An immediate objection to overturning Wickard would be the resurr-
ection of the direct-indirect test. While Jones & Laughlin Steel utilized that test, 
nothing would preclude the Court from finding a new, more workable test.200 
Like the Constitution itself, McGinnis and Rappaport’s approach establishes 
only guiding principles, not a full-fledged methodology. Courts are still free to 
create rules and tests through precedent that will effectuate those principles.201 
Thus, the Court is free to devise a new test, so long as the test remains within the 
confines of the Constitution and entrenched precedent. The final Part will lay out 
a means by which to strike Jones & Laughlin Steel’s balance, providing for 
federal regulatory authority but exempting purely local activity.  
 
IV. UTILIZING PERSONAL JURISDICTION’S STREAM OF COMMERCE TEST 
WOULD PROVIDE A MEANINGFUL WAY TO EFFECTUATE A DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s precedent theory has shown that Wickard 
cannot be sustained. There is no consensus supporting the obliteration of the 
“distinction between what is national and what is local.”202 McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s theory highlights the confines within which commerce jurispru-
dence can operate, namely the text and history of the Commerce Clause itself 
along with the added ability to regulate production of goods and services that 
																																								 																				
199 See supra notes 85-87 (noting Jones & Laughlin Steel’s consistency with earlier cases). 
200 The most problematic feature of the direct-indirect test, as it had become by the time of 
Wrightwood Dairy, was that it required the Court to make economic judgments about whether 
a given activity would substantially affect interstate commerce. United States v. Wrightwood 
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942). It was the reticence to decide aggregate economic impacts 
that led the Court to abandon the test. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. 
201 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 809-24 (discussing and approving of the 
use of precedent in the American system). Further the mere fact that a precedent’s principle 
has become entrenched does not mean that every last syllable in the opinion should be 
applied. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of entrenchment). 
202 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).  
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will enter interstate commerce, per Jones & Laughlin Steel. Within these 
parameters, a test that is both respectful of the intentions behind the Commerce 
Clause, but cognizant of the modern economy’s needs, can be constructed.  
By overruling Wickard’s substantial effects test and replacing it with a 
test examining whether a producer or seller is either targeting interstate 
commerce or is a part of interstate commerce, the Court can once again give 
real meaning to the Commerce Clause’s protection of purely intrastate activity 
without declaring “a vast number of government programs” unconstitu-
tional.203 The net effects of this approach would be comparatively minimal but 
quite meaningful. In today’s global economy, the vast majority of commercial 
transactions take place on a national or international scale. Thus, under the 
approach proposed here, Congress would continue to have power over most 
economic matters. But the recognition that Congress’s commerce power has 
real limits would affirm “the federal balance the Framers designed and that 
[the] Court is obliged to enforce.”204 Moreover, adoption of such a test would 
give small, local businesses the choice to refrain from targeting the stream of 
interstate commerce and thereby avoid burdensome federal regulation.  
This Part will map out how the Court could begin to rethink commerce 
jurisprudence under this balanced approach. First, regardless of the path the 
Court takes, Congress would still have robust authority to regulate the channels 
and instrumentalities of commerce. Second, under this approach, Congress 
could continue to regulate the production and service businesses that target the 
stream of interstate commerce. However, the Court would place limitations on 
Congress’s commerce power, utilizing a modified version of personal jurisdic-
tion’s stream of commerce test and the original understanding of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  
 
A. Congress Would Still Have Broad Authority to Regulate Channels 
and Instrumentalities of Commerce Under the Traditional Doctrine 
 
Congress has always enjoyed broad authority in regulating the channels 
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce.205 Services relating to channels 
and instrumentalities have traditionally fallen within the Commerce Clause.206 
And, Congress’s robust authority extends through the Necessary and Proper 
																																								 																				
203 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 837. 
204 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
205 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing early court opinions that recognize 
Congress’s broad authority over the channels and instrumentalities of commerce).  
206 See Hannibal & St. Johns R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470 (1877) (“Transportation is 
essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce itself; and every obstacle to it, or burden laid 
upon it by legislative authority, is regulation.”). 
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Clause to intrastate activities that interfere with the flow of interstate comm-
erce.207 Thus, under the approach this Article proposes, Congress’s robust auth-
ority to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce is maintained. 
The distinction, resulting from overruling Wickard’s rational-basis type 
review, would be that the government would bear the burden of showing that 
the end sought ensures protection of the stream of commerce against an activity 
that “interferes with, obstructs, or prevents” the flow.208 But this is not a heavy 
burden, given the Court’s traditionally lenient view of Congress’s power to 
protect the stream of interstate commerce.209 
Congress’s breadth of authority over protecting the flow of commerce 
would have important implications for a key civil rights case. In 1964, the 
Court upheld the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of race-
based discrimination by hotels against an intrastate motel operation.210 Although 
the case was an easy one under Wickard’s substantial effects test,211 the regula-
tion could still be upheld under the traditional channels and instrumentalities 
doctrine.212 Thus, key precedents like Heart of Atlanta Motel would be secure.213 
																																								 																				
207 See Cushman, supra note 50, at 1130 (explaining how Shreveport Rate’s decision to let 
Congress regulate intrastate railroad rates was based on the need to protect the flow of interstate 
commerce); see also The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564 (1870) (noting that Congress may advance 
legislation to protect interstate commerce).  
208 United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 78 (1838). 
209 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the cases that represent an expansive 
view of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause).  
210 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243-44 (1964).  
211 See id. at 258 (noting the ease of finding that a local activity affects interstate commerce).  
212 See id. at 256 (citing the Passenger Cases for the proposition that Congress has the authority 
to regulate activities involving interstate transportation); see also id. at 252-53 (discussing 
Congress’s extensive findings regarding the great difficulties posed to African-Americans in 
finding lodgings during interstate travel and the resulting impact on their ability to engage in 
interstate travel); see also United States v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 272 U.S. 457, 464 (1926) 
(discussing Congress’s broad authority to regulate intrastate activities that are so “interwoven” 
with interstate channels and instrumentalities of commerce that “the regulation of [one] is so 
incidental to and inseparable from the regulation” of the other).  
213 The often-associated case of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), which enforced 
the Civil Rights Act against a local restaurant that refused to serve minorities, raises different 
considerations. Unlike hotels, which specifically target long-distance travelers, a given restaurant 
might be targeting only local patrons. Further, although the district court found that the 
restaurant’s food came from outside the state, the restaurant bought the food through a local 
supplier. Id. at 297. Though the theory proposed here would allow Congress to regulate the 
distributor for buying through the stream of interstate commerce, see infra subsection IV.C.1, if 
the restaurant purchased only locally and targeted an intrastate market, the commerce power 
would not extend to it. Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 
(1935) (noting that there must be a point in time where products cease to be interstate commerce). 
However, because of the high regard given to the Court’s civil-rights era decisions, the Court 
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B. That Congress Can Regulate Business Transactions Generally, Not 
Just Exchange of Goods, Has Become Entrenched 
 
Today, “commerce” is generally considered to include any “gainful 
activity.”214 Although this fact would not matter to a purely originalist analysis, 
it is critical to McGinnis and Rappaport’s entrenched precedent approach. Thus, 
given the current understanding that “commerce” refers to any economic 
activity, the Court could find that cases like Jones & Laughlin Steel—extending 
Congress’s regulatory authority to the mining, manufacturing, agricultural, and 
service industries—can be upheld as entrenched precedents.215 
The Court can also affirm that Congress can use its prohibitory power as 
a mechanism for regulating goods and services that enter interstate comm-
erce.216 Doing so would require the Court to look no further than its own 
traditional jurisprudence.217 And because Congress has strong authority to pro-
hibit goods from entering interstate commerce, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
would also give Congress the power to enforce compliance with its regula-
tions.218 Thus, any regulation with “some obvious, simple, and direct relation” 
to the legitimate end of prohibiting goods that do not comply with federal stan-
dards from entering the stream of interstate commerce would be upheld.219 
																																								 																				
could well conclude that societal consensus supports McClung’s holding, giving Congress 
continued authority to prohibit race-based discrimination by businesses in general. Alternatively, 
McGinnis and Rappaport provide a method for affirming important civil rights cases that 
corrected the “imperfections in the supermajoritarian process,” namely the exclusion of racial 
minorities and women.  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 841. Both Heart of Atlanta 
and McClung could very well be considered such corrective precedents. 
214 Barnett, supra note 26, at 104; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 852 (stating 
that Congress’s commerce authority is generally viewed to cover any “economic matters”).  
215 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 198; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 852 
(noting how today’s understanding of what constitutes commerce allows Congress to regulate 
more matters than a purely originalist reading).  
216 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (finding that Congress could forbid from 
interstate commerce goods produced by companies failing to comply with employment regulations).  
217 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 298 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“From an early time 
in our national history, the Federal Government has used its enumerated powers, such as its power 
to regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting public morality . . . .”); Hipolite Egg 
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911) (stating that the power to regulate interstate 
commerce includes “the right to bar” certain items from the stream of interstate commerce); see 
also The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 359-60 (1903) (noting that because the “power to regulate 
interstate commerce is . . . full and complete,” Congress may prohibit items and contracts from 
interstate commerce as it sees fit).  
218 See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. at 58 (citing McCulloch as allowing Congress to 
authorize seizure of non-compliant articles after they had passed through the stream of inter-
state commerce).  
219 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 612-13 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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C. That Congress Can Regulate Absolutely Anything Has Not Become 
Entrenched and Needs Replacement 
 
The question of what role the federal government should play in the 
regulation of businesses, especially small businesses, is very much a contested 
point.220 Thus, Wickard’s allowing the federal government to regulate virtually 
any remote activity having some economic impact is not entrenched. Adopting 
the more recent understanding of what comprises “commerce,” by itself, would 
give Congress authority to continue regulating most economic transactions. 
But recognizing that the clause has real power would not just be a hollow 
genuflection to federalism. It would place actual constraints on Congress’s 
authority in a manner that better reflects the principles of limited government 
and recognizes that Congress does not enjoy a national police power.  
First, this Section will show how the Court can replace Wickard and 
implement a test to determine if a business is engaging in interstate commerce. 
Despite the cries that formalistic tests do not work, the Court has developed 
and implemented a test regarding whether a court has personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant, based on the defendant’s use of the stream of interstate 
commerce.221 Because courts routinely apply this personal jurisdiction test, the 
Court could adopt a modified version of it to decide whether there is a direct 
effect on interstate commerce. Second, this Section argues that Congress 
cannot use the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach purely local activity. 
Instead, Congress’s power is limited to regulating direct engagement in 
interstate commerce.  
 
1. Regulation of Commercial Activities Utilizing Stream of 
Interstate Commerce 
 
Given that Wickard is wrongly decided on originalist grounds and that 
it does not enjoy the public support necessary to plausibly become a 
constitutional amendment, the Court should overrule it. Of course, this 
conclusion leads to the problem of deciding if something is interstate or 
intrastate commerce. An inability to adopt a workable test would mean that the 
costs of overruling Wickard could overshadow any supermajoritarian benefits. 
The direct-indirect test, as understood by Wickard, proved unworkable mostly 
because the Court was left to speculate about whether activity directly affected 
																																								 																				
220 See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (discussing polling data regarding federal 
regulation).  
221 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (asking 
whether the defendant intended to deliver products into the stream of commerce leading to 
the forum state).  
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commerce from an abstract economic perspective.222 Indeed, the Court refused 
to look at the seller’s intentions to engage in interstate commerce and instead 
relied on categorical decisions regarding if something directly or indirectly 
affected commerce.223  
However, adopting a test measuring whether the seller intends to 
engage in interstate commerce eliminates Justice Jackson’s concerns about 
formalistic categories or the Court’s incompetence in judging economic 
relationships.224 Courts would simply ask if a given business is engaging in 
buying or selling through interstate commerce. And the test this Article pro-
poses is one that courts are quite familiar with—they already use it when 
deciding if there is personal jurisdiction over a business defendant.  
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,225 the Court held that if 
a seller targets a forum state through the stream of interstate commerce, the 
seller can be held liable to a judgment in personam. In other words, by 
“purposefully avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State,” the seller waives its ability to be free of an adverse judgment 
in that state’s court.226  
The very same logic could apply to whether regulations under the 
commerce power extend to a business. Thus, this Article proposes importing 
personal jurisdiction’s stream-of-commerce logic into determining if a given 
enterprise is engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce. Through choosing 
to engage in interstate commerce, by either directing products or services “into 
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers”227 from another state or by purchasing products or services from 
the stream of interstate commerce, a business could be said to have purpose-
fully availed itself to federal regulation.228 Hence, importing personal 
jurisdiction’s stream-of-commerce test has the two-fold advantage of both 
putting real limitations on the commerce power, while providing a test that 
federal judges are already used to. 
																																								 																				
222 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing the direct-indirect test’s 
development).  
223 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304-05 (1936) (stating that mining, 
agriculture, and manufacturing are inherently intrastate activities and refusing to adopt a rule 
that would test whether the producer intended to sell the goods into interstate commerce).  
224 See Cushman, supra note 50, at 1141 (quoting a memorandum from Justice Jackson to 
his law clerk about what path the Court should take in Wickard).  
225 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).  
226 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  
227 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.  
228 By looking to the intent of the seller, this test resembles the traditional approach taken in 
the antitrust cases regarding whether a business intended to directly affect interstate 
commerce. Cushman, supra note 50, at 1096. 
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But instead of asking if a particular state was targeted, as personal 
jurisdiction’s test does, the test offered here would simply ask whether the busi-
ness has targeted the stream of interstate commerce generally. While hard cases 
will always abound at the margins, most businesses in general, and virtually all 
large corporations, would likely continue to be subject to federal regulation.229 
Any business that engages in providing or procuring goods or services from 
multistate or multinational markets utilizes the stream of commerce. For 
example, both a restaurant company with a chain of locations in multiple states 
and a manufacturing plant purchasing raw materials from another state have 
engaged directly in interstate commerce.230 
The businesses that would benefit from this reading of the Commerce 
Clause would be small, local businesses. And it is here that line-drawing prob-
lems will begin to appear, especially given that many small businesses have an 
Internet presence. There is also the question of what happens to a small 
business that does not intend to engage in interstate commerce, but ends up 
acquiring out-of-state patrons. While these problems are unavoidable, line 
drawing is no excuse for courts to refrain from enforcing the Constitution’s 
structural provisions.231 Indeed, line-drawing issues are far from abnormal in 
the area of personal jurisdiction.232  
However, just as with the due process protections of personal juris-
diction, the perfect should not be the enemy of the good for Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.233 Some courts have recognized that there is a “sliding scale” 
																																								 																				
229 And, because this theory upholds Darby’s broad understanding of Congress’s prohibitory 
power, Congress can continue regulating various aspects of a business’s operations once the 
business chooses to engage in interstate commerce. See supra notes 216-18 and 
accompanying text. However, since this test is not rational-basis level scrutiny, Congress 
would bear the burden of showing that its means chosen are “appropriate” and “plainly 
adapted” to achieving a legitimate end. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).  
230 Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (looking at 
whether a business’s advertising is reasonably calculated to reach another state).  
231 See Calabresi, supra note 8, at 804-06 (noting that Commerce Clause line-drawing and fact-
finding problems would be “no more difficult than they are in the context of determining what 
constitutes an impermissible endorsement of religion or when an abortion law violates the doctri-
nally recognized right to privacy or when unprotected obscenity becomes protected pornography”).  
232 See, e.g., Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the 
“Interwebs”, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2015) (discussing the lack of clear direction 
in whether and how an Internet presence creates purposeful benefit to another state).  
233 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, 
J., concurring) (finding that “[a]ctivities local in their immediacy do not become interstate 
and national because of distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant may at times 
be uncertain. . . . [But to] find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost everywhere. 
If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract 
them, there will be an end to our federal system” (citation omitted)).  
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between a business where all or most of its transactions are done through the 
Internet and a business that passively maintains a website for advertisement.234 
Under this approach, a web-based business targeting a national or global market 
is engaging in interstate commerce. However, a local brick-and-mortar business 
with a website is more likely to be engaging in intrastate commerce. As with 
personal jurisdiction, courts could weigh whether a business has purposely 
availed itself to a multistate market through its Internet presence. 
Another potentially problematic issue is what happens if out-of-state 
patrons partake of a business’s goods or services. This is not a new problem 
for determining whether an activity has a direct or indirect effect on commerce. 
But here too, under the test this Article proposes, the question of whether a 
seller is purposely availing its products and services to an intrastate versus an 
interstate market could be assessed by the facts of the case.235 If a restaurant is 
located immediately off an interstate highway and has advertisements posted 
on the highway, it is rather obviously targeting an interstate market.236 Mean-
while, a small-town diner that principally serves a local populace, but 
sometimes has out-of-town visitors stop in for a bite to eat would be intrastate. 
Even though some patrons may be from out-of-state, if the facts showed that 
the diner sought to serve an intrastate market, then it has not purposely availed 
itself to an interstate market.237 
In time, courts would develop methods for determining whether a small 
business seeks to engage in interstate commerce by looking factors such as: 
where the business advertises; whether the business regularly purchases 
supplies from out-of-state vendors; if the business has a history of serving a 
more localized community; if the business allows for ordering or purchasing 
through its website; and whether the business is located in a place that is more 
																																								 																				
234 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  
235 Indeed, this inquiry is not all that different from an important theme that Chief Justice 
Hughes mentions a number of times in Jones & Laughlin Steel, namely that when an activity 
has such a “close and substantial relation” with interstate commerce, the business subjects 
itself to Congress’s control. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); see also Friedman, supra note 78, at 1966-
67 (discussing Chief Justice Hughes’s concern that later cases like Darby were pushing the 
bounds of “close and substantial relation” too far).   
236 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 38 (finding that “the close and intimate effect which 
brings the [business] within the reach of federal power may be due to activities”).  
237 Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 890-91 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (discussing how a decision finding personal jurisdiction over a defendant must 
be based on something more than the defendant having reason to know that its products 
“might” be sold to someone from any of the fifty states); see also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899) (noting how a company has directed its products 
at interstate commerce).  
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likely to service an interstate market.238 Further, the task of courts in deciding 
whether a business participates in interstate commerce would be made easier by 
Congress’s exclusion of small businesses from legislation. Indeed, major 
regulatory regimes often exempt small businesses.239 Such statutory exemptions 
would help keep many problematic cases from ever coming into being. 
As McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory shows, the balance struck by 
Jones & Laughlin Steel should be the standard.240 There, the Court recognized 
that any business directing itself at the stream of interstate commerce could be 
regulated. But it continued to examine Congress’s commerce power “in the 
light of our dual system of government” to keep from “effectually obliterat[ing] 
the distinction between what is national and what is local and creat[ing] a 
completely centralized government.”241 By looking at whether a business 
chooses to engage in interstate commerce, the test advocated here would allow 
courts to effectively police the scope of government regulation without 
precluding most federal regulatory authority. 
In sum, under this approach, the vast majority of businesses would 
continue to be subject to the various federal regulations dependent upon 
Congress’s broad commerce power. Once a business purposefully avails itself 
to an interstate or international market, it comes within the reach of federal 
regulation. Only small businesses, targeting insular local markets, would be 
exempt from federal regulations. While many small business owners would be 
relieved of various wage and employment provisions, along with other federal 
regulations, this result is nothing close to the “immediate elimination of a vast 
number of government programs” that McGinnis and Rappaport find 
unacceptable or that critics of a stricter interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
fear.242 Because this test returns some of the benefits of the Commerce Clause’s 
structural protections—which have not been overridden by a supermajoritarian 
concurrence—without enormous costs, it should be adopted.  
																																								 																				
238 Cf. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 804-06 (arguing that the Court’s fear about incompetence 
in handling Commerce Clause cases is unfounded given its dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence and its regular exercise of judicial review).  
239 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (c)(2)(A) (exempting businesses with less than fifty 
employees from the ACA’s employer mandate); 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (exempting 
businesses with sales of less than $500,000 from the FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) 
(exempting businesses with less than fifty employees from the Family & Medical Leave 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining an “employer” under Title VII as having “fifteen or 
more employees” that “affect[s] commerce”). 
240 See supra Section III.B (discussing how Jones & Laughlin Steel balanced the idea of a 
Commerce Clause distinguishing national from local, while allowing Congress to reach 
production and services). 
241 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.  
242 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 837.  
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2. Regulation of Activities Through the Necessary and  
Proper Clause 
 
Wickard’s holding that allows regulation of any activity affecting 
interstate commerce also cannot be justified on the basis of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. As discussed above,243 the Necessary and Proper Clause vests 
Congress with only incidental authority. Congress cannot use the clause to ex-
pand its powers, but only to further the operation of its enumerated powers.244 
Action under the clause must involve “exercises of authority derivative of, and 
in service to, a granted power.”245 In other words, the action must be “narrow 
in scope” and “incidental” to the exercise of commerce authority.246 Just 
because an action may be “necessary,” it will not be “proper” if it effectively 
creates a “substantive and independent power.”247   
The approach of Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB gets the doctrine right 
as an original matter.248 Like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, he high-
lights the agency-law notion of incidental authority as an underlying assum-
ption of the Necessary and Proper Clause.249 The powers flowing from the 
clause must be incidental to the enumerated powers given in Article I.  
Thus, while the Necessary and Proper Clause could allow for the 
regulation of intrastate economic activities directed at interstate commerce or 
of activities that harm the flow of interstate commerce, it would not give 
Congress the authority to regulate activities that indirectly affect interstate 
commerce.250 This understanding is consistent with Shreveport Rate, Jones & 
Laughlin Steel, Hipolite Egg, and Darby. However, it stands in opposition to 
Wickard and Raich, which involved purely intrastate activities not directed at 
																																								 																				
243 See supra Section I.C (discussing the scope of Congress’s authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause).  
244 See THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(stating that structural limitations will set the boundaries for operation under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause). 
245 NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 560 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
246 Id. (citation omitted). 
247 Id. at 561 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 411 (1819)).  
248 See supra notes 119-45 and accompanying text (discussing the different interpretations 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
249 See John T. Valauri, Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
773, 786-87 (2013) (comparing Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion with McCulloch and noting its 
incorporation of “agency law concepts and fiduciary principles of the founding era”).  
250 Congress has the power to prevent activities that threaten the flow of commerce, United 
States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 78 (1838), and to prohibit certain products from entering the 
flow of commerce. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57 (1911). Thus, it can 
erect regulations that give effect to these powers. 
Vol. 3:2]   Originalism and the General Concurrence 
 
 
303 
the stream of interstate commerce. The intrastate train rates in Shreveport Rate 
harmed the flow of interstate commerce. And the products in Jones & Laughlin 
Steel, Hipolite Egg, and Darby were directed at an interstate market. 
Meanwhile, Wickard and Raich dealt only with home consumption. Finding 
authority to regulate in those cases “is to find it almost everywhere” and thus 
puts “an end to our federal system.”251 
Finally, as for non-economic activities, although Congress has the 
authority to regulate and proscribe activities that affect the channels and 
instrumentalities of commerce, it cannot regulate non-economic activities that 
simply affect economic forces.252 This dichotomy is not because the original 
public meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause is somehow weaker than the 
Court’s understanding in McCulloch. Indeed, when an action is incidental to an 
enumerated power, the Court is “very deferential” to whether the regulation is 
“necessary.”253 The problem with regulating non-economic activity, which does 
not interfere with the flow of commerce, is that the Commerce Clause is 
inherently directed at economic activity.254 Therefore, attempts to regulate non-
economic activity are not covered by the Commerce Clause, giving no derivative 
authority to operate through the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As Justice Thomas has recognized, giving “the original understanding 
and our first century and a half of case law” more of a role to play in modern 
commerce jurisprudence “does not necessarily require a wholesale abandonment 
of our more recent opinions.”255 By overruling Wickard and replacing it with a 
test that asks whether an enterprising activity has targeted the interstate market, 
with the government bearing the burden showing the purposeful availment, the 
Court could strike a balance between the federalism protections embodied in the 
Commerce Clause and the abundance of precedents that have sprung up since 
the late 1930s.  
The result of the Court taking this approach is unlikely to lead to a 
massive upheaval in terms of federal regulatory power. Most challenges to 
federal authority would be as-applied, not facial. And, of course, the Court 
																																								 																				
251 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).  
252 See Natelson, supra note 29, at 99 (discussing the narrowness of framing-era under-
standing of what “commerce” constituted). 
253 NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
254 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (noting that, “[T]hus far in our 
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity 
only where that activity is economic in nature”).   
255 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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always has the power to construe statutes so as to avoid Commerce Clause 
concerns.256 However, asserting that the Commerce Clause grants real pro-
tection is far from trivial—it goes to the heart of our system of government.  
In setting out to form a more perfect union, We the People created a 
government of limited powers. Yet, over the centuries, that government has 
been allowed to gain more power than originally envisioned. As the vanguard 
of this great enterprise, the Court must protect the People’s sovereignty by 
respecting their will. The default for determining that will is the original public 
meaning of the Constitution’s text, as amended. But if the Court has been 
mistaken about key constitutional provisions, it can look to both the sentiment 
of the People and their reliance on the precedent to decide between original 
public meaning and stare decisis. By doing so, the Court respects the basic 
premise of our system—that sovereignty ultimately resides with the People. 
 
																																								 																				
256 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 173 (2001) (construing a statute in light of Lopez and Morrison); see also United States 
v. Jones, 529 U.S. 848, 857-58 (2000) (finding that an owner-occupied residence is not used 
“in commerce,” preventing federal prosecution for arson and avoiding the question of 
whether Congress used the Commerce Clause to gain police power); Howard v. Ill. Cent. R. 
Co., 207 U.S. 463, 541 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that a statute whose terms 
applied to “every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce” could have been read as 
only applying to common carriers involved in interstate commerce). 
